The Yarlung Tsangpo Legend

Prepared by Peter Li-Chang Kuo

The "Helsinki Rules," adopted by the International Law Association (ILA) at its 1966 conference in Helsinki, Finland, are a set of highly authoritative but non-binding international guidelines. These rules govern the fair and reasonable use of transboundary rivers, laying the foundation of modern international water law. They emphasize equitable and reasonable utilization, cooperation and consultation, and the principle of no significant harm to other riparian states.

The "1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses" builds upon the main principles of the "Helsinki Rules." It further clarifies the primacy of equitable and reasonable utilization and elaborates supporting mechanisms such as dispute resolution and information exchange. The Helsinki Rules’ core doctrine—that no riparian state shall cause substantial harm to another—was enshrined as a fundamental obligation in the 1997 Convention. These two legal instruments are critical milestones in the evolution of international water law.

While the Helsinki Rules are not legally binding, the 1997 UN Convention is a legally binding multilateral treaty, enforceable upon states that have formally ratified it. Signatory nations are obliged to comply with the rights and responsibilities set forth in the convention. However, China is not a party to this convention.

In July 2025, a major international headline broke on July 19, when Chinese Premier Li Qiang announced that the Yarjiang Group would invest 1.2 trillion RMB to construct a massive dam project on the Yarlung Tsangpo River (referred to hereafter as Yarjiang). The engineering strategy includes "river straightening" and "tunnel-based water diversion," with plans to build five cascade hydropower stations, producing three times the electricity output of the Three Gorges Dam. The project site lies near the Namcha Barwa Peak, at an elevation of 7,782 meters, laying down what could become a "hydrological time bomb" in the volatile Sino-Indian border region.

Fig 1: The majestic Namcha Barwa Peak in Tibet

Although India is not a member of APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), which comprises 21 member economies, I once met an Indian scholar at the 2009 APEC Leaders' Summit. With deep concern, he told me: “India’s Ganges River might die!”

He feared that China’s upstream control over transboundary rivers might fatally damage the Ganges’ ecosystem, potentially causing it to dry up. He said that his purpose for attending the summit was to seek a meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao.

Back then, I had business ties with India’s top three electronics manufacturers, and the Indian representative (diplomat) in Taiwan was a close friend of mine. I also had a business presence in Singapore, where I had developed many friendships with Indian entrepreneurs and scholars, who impressed me with their competence in both academia and commerce. So, encountering an Indian delegate at APEC felt particularly warm and familiar.

He brought up the "Water Bomb Incident" of 2000. On April 9, 2000, a massive landslide occurred near the Yigong Tsangpo Gorge in Bomi County, Southern Tibet, where more than 300 million cubic meters of rock collapsed from an elevation of over 5,500 meters, forming a natural dam roughly 3,000 meters long, 1,500 meters wide, and 90 meters high. This impounded the river and created the Yigong landslide-dammed lake, storing up to 3 billion cubic meters of water—210 times the volume of West Lake in Hangzhou.

Over the next two months, the lake level kept rising, reaching 34 square kilometers in surface area. As the monsoon approached, increased rainfall added pressure to the dam. On the night of June 10, 2000, at 7 p.m., the natural dam breached, unleashing a giant wall of water over 100 meters high. The floodwaters, carrying immense destructive force, surged downstream along the Yigong Tsangpo, flooding vast areas for 12 hours before the lake fully drained.

The destruction was catastrophic. Downstream forests, roads, and homes were destroyed. The Tongmai Bridge on China’s National Highway 318, which crosses the Yigong Tsangpo (a tributary of the Palong Tsangpo), was submerged by over 30 meters of water. The flood wave surged into the mainstream Yarlung Tsangpo, rapidly raising water levels and causing severe floods in India, affecting over 500,000 people, destroying homes, and inflicting enormous economic loss and casualties.

This event was likened to the explosion of a "water bomb" due to the lake’s vast volume, the high rate of release, and its devastating downstream impact. It posed a grave threat to southern Tibet and Indian border areas, prompting India to mobilize its military in preparation for emergency response.

This extreme natural disaster exposed the fragile and perilous geological environment of high-altitude rivers and became a key reason for India’s wariness toward China’s upstream hydropower construction on the Yarjiang.

The Indian scholar also mentioned the Three Gorges Dam.

He said:

“Although the Three Gorges Dam is located in Hubei, since it began operation, India’s climate, rainfall patterns, and ecosystems have undergone noticeable changes!”

He argued that India relies on the summer southwest monsoon for water supply. If East Asia’s atmospheric circulation patterns shift, it could cause the monsoon belt to move southward or weaken, reducing rainfall in northern and northeastern India. Since the Yangtze River is part of the Asian monsoon system, altering its water distribution, evaporation, and heat exchange (via large reservoirs) could trigger a monsoon coupling chain reaction, subtly disrupting South Asia’s monsoon.

He emphasized that China controls the headwaters of several major transboundary rivers—including the Yarlung Tsangpo, Lancang (Mekong), and Nujiang (Salween)—and has become a "hydro-hegemon," exerting pressure on downstream countries. Through dam construction and river diversion projects, China is deploying a "silent geostrategic weapon." The Three Gorges Dam symbolizes China’s "hydropolitics," and its model is now being replicated in Tibet, at the headwaters of India’s Brahmaputra River, constituting a serious threat to northeastern India’s water security. He warned that a future "water war" might become inevitable.

I remember my first trip to mainland China in 1989. That evening, Nanjing Road in Shanghai was pitch dark. During a candlelight dinner, a Chinese friend said: “If we just build a dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo in Tibet, we’ll never have power outages again!”

Then he added: “And we could also take care of India at the same time!”

Those words shook me—like someone threatening to stab my closest friend. Many of my Indian friends are dear to me, so hearing such a statement felt deeply unsettling.

The next day, even non-APEC members like Myanmar representatives were quarreling with the Chinese delegation at the Suntec Convention Center in Singapore, also over upstream dam-building.

The Lancang River (Mekong) enters Myanmar first, running for about 100 kilometers before continuing through Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The Nujiang River also flows into Myanmar as the Salween River, continuing southward into the Andaman Sea.

The Mega-Dams' Threat

China has constructed multiple large-scale dams on the Jinsha River, Nu River (Salween), and Lancang River (upper Mekong), causing significant hydrological, ecological, and economic impacts on downstream countries—Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. These impacts include worsening droughts, floods, and ecological degradation. Myanmar, as one of the primary affected nations, has expressed strong opposition to the potential water stress and ecological risks posed by these dams.

As of mid-2025, most of the completed, ongoing, or planned dams along the Yarlung Tsangpo River (Yarjiang) are located in Tibet, on the upper and middle reaches. Some of these are classified as "strategic hydropower projects"—such as the Zangmu Hydropower Station in Gyaca County, Pondo Hydropower Station on the Lhasa-Shannan border, the Zhigongqu Station in Nyingchi, and the Gyirong Station Cluster on a tributary of the Yarlung Tsangpo.

The Indian scholar mentioned earlier was particularly concerned about the Zangmu Hydropower Station. Now, the newly announced dam project is expected to be located at the "Great Bend" of the Yarlung Tsangpo—within Motuo County, Nyingchi, known as the Motuo Hydropower Station. This site is considered the most promising location for hydropower development in China, with an estimated installed capacity of 60–70 million kilowatts, and an annual power generation of 279.3–300 billion kWh—three times the output of the Three Gorges Dam.

Fig 2: Proposed Dam Location at the Great Bend of the Yarlung Tsangpo

The Motuo Hydropower Project plans to exploit a 2,000-meter elevation drop within a 50-km stretch, using a rare development method of “river straightening” and “tunnel diversion”, and proposes the construction of five cascade power stations. With a total investment of 1.2 trillion RMB, it is the largest and most technically challenging hydropower project in China’s history. The site lies in the core zone of the Eastern Himalayan tectonic belt, a geologically complex region with fractured rock formations, high in-situ stress, and risks of rockbursts. The seismic intensity may reach "Magnitude 9," making it one of the most geologically unstable and seismically active zones in the world—posing immense construction challenges.

From China’s strategic perspective, this dam is seen as a way to secure energy supplies, reduce dependence on fossil fuels, and cut carbon emissions. It also serves geopolitical interests, especially concerning the Sino-Indian border and China’s influence in South Asia.

From an international viewpoint, the Yarlung Tsangpo flows through the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, a global ecological hotspot and seismic zone. The safety of the dam structure and its ecological impact have sparked global controversy. Countries downstream, such as India and Bangladesh, have voiced serious concerns, fearing water flow alteration or even "the weaponization of water."

Dr. Wang Weiluo, a hydrologist and territorial resources expert, has cited Laozi’s Dao De Jing, which says: “Water can overcome the strongest substances in the world.” He warns that the Motuo Dam could result in massive siltation, with an annual sediment concentration increase of 18%. If the sediment-rich water is pressurized through tunnels, it could become an unstoppable force, and in the event of a dam failure, the consequences might surpass the “Water Bomb” disaster of 2000.

Once completed, the dam is expected to retain up to 70% of the river’s flow, leaving only “one-third of the natural discharge.” This would place over hundreds of endemic species in the Yarlung Tsangpo Basin at risk of extinction. The area is renowned for its biological richness, and the dam's reservoir could flood rare habitats, disrupt fish migration, and collapse aquatic ecosystems.

The dam would “trap sediment” and alter the river's hydrology, threatening riverbank erosion, agricultural losses, and drinking water shortages downstream, severely impacting countries like India and Bangladesh, whose local populations rely heavily on these waters.

Dr. Wang further emphasized that the Motuo Dam would likely devastate the ecosystem of the Namcha Barwa region and the Yarlung Tsangpo Basin, particularly its “biodiversity.” The dam’s construction and operation could change the region’s hydrology and pose latent risks to both the ecological environment and geological stability.

Fig 3: Namcha Barwa—A View That May Become a Memory

Environmentalists and international experts widely agree that super-dams like Motuo pose grave threats to ecosystems, biodiversity, and tectonic stability in the Namcha Barwa and Yarlung Tsangpo regions. From an "ESG" (Environmental, Social, and Governance) perspective, such megaprojects lack sufficient information disclosure, transparency, and public participation, leading to criticism for disregarding environmental and social responsibility standards.

Although China argues that the dam would contribute to "carbon neutrality," experts warn that the dam’s "methane emissions," ecological damage, and irreversible destruction of natural systems far outweigh its "green energy" label. There are calls to exclude hydropower from the mainstream green energy category.

India has voiced grave concerns about the Motuo Dam, particularly regarding control over transboundary water, reduced downstream water flows, and the potential use of the dam as a "geopolitical tool." In the event of conflict, China could restrict water flow or release floodwaters, leading to catastrophic consequences for downstream countries.

Moreover, the Namcha Barwa region is rising by about 3 cm (30 mm) per year, a phenomenon known as "crustal uplift," resulting from the ongoing collision between the Indian and Eurasian tectonic plates. This compression causes the Himalayas and surrounding areas, including Namcha Barwa, to rise steadily in elevation.

This crustal uplift indicates that the Himalayas—including Namcha Barwa—remain an "active orogenic belt," still undergoing dynamic geological formation, and have not reached a stable phase. Furthermore, earthquakes may open fissures, allowing water to seep out, and uplift can also cause fractures, leading to potential dam failure. If that happens, it could trigger a catastrophic disaster of historic proportions.

Fig 4: Nanga Bawa and Yajiang Dam Construction S

The Connection Between Dams and Debt

A popular pundit Susuhan recently discussed China's debt, revealing staggering figures: central government debt at ¥35 trillion, local government debt at ¥47 trillion, household debt at ¥37 trillion, and corporate debt at ¥120 trillion— “totaling ¥ 239 trillion in RMB.” These astronomical numbers sounded unbelievable, prompting verification. According to data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China’s total debt stands at approximately 257% to 312% of GDP. Based on China’s 2024 GDP of about ¥128 trillion, the total debt ranges between ¥327 trillion and ¥400 trillion.

To address this, the Chinese government has proposed a "debt restructuring strategy"—replacing short-term high-interest debt with long-term low-interest loans. For instance, using a ¥200,000 three-year loan at 3% interest to refinance a ¥100,000 one-year loan at 10%, aiming to reduce the overall debt burden.

The following day, Su turned to what she called the "limitless business potential" of the Yarlung Tsangpo Dam. She suggested investing in its bonds and stocks. The Yarjing Group, a newly established state-owned enterprise, is responsible for constructing large-scale hydropower projects on the lower Yarlung Tsangpo River. Given the project's massive scale—with capital needs of around RMB 1.2 trillion—it relies on financing through bond issuance and stock offerings, a common model for major infrastructure projects. This allows the spreading of financial risk and invites participation from both private and institutional investors.

The perceived “infinite opportunity” of the Yarlung Tsangpo Dam lies in its upstream and supporting industries: power equipment manufacturing (hydro-turbine generators, transformers, transmission infrastructure), construction machinery, engineering and building, as well as cement and steel. By attracting investment, the Yarjing Group aims to accelerate the project while stimulating demand across related industries. Furthermore, its role in transforming China's energy structure into greener sources has made it a focus of capital and strategic interest.

However, if one observes this project in light of China's overall debt burden (¥239–400 trillion), a reasonable inference emerges:

"Large-scale strategic infrastructure projects may be the first step in debt restructuring."

Through increased investment, China hopes to boost book asset values, construct future revenue models, and repackage the project as a combination of "Western development, carbon neutrality, and green energy transformation." New financial instruments—such as bonds, REITs, and equity shares—can then be issued to ease the country’s pressing debt pressures.

Experts interpret this as a "geo-financial maneuver," converting potential liabilities into future assets to support the current fiscal and economic system. Yet the underlying risks are significant, especially under the global trends of de-risking from China and tightened climate-related financial regulation. If tensions with neighboring countries escalate or ESG (Environmental, Social, Governance) deviations become too apparent, this could trigger sanctions or capital flight, further worsening debt conditions.

Even more concerning is that as India escalates its policy of asserting “water sovereignty”, China may reframe the dam as a strategic asset, emphasizing military-civilian integration and upgrading its national security significance. This could lead to heightened regional tension, with armed conflict a real possibility.

Conclusion

Indian strategic thinker Brahma Chellaney, in his 2011 book "Water: Asia’s New Battlefield," warned that competition over water resources could become a major source of regional conflict. His concerns focused on tensions arising from transboundary river water rights and usage, especially between China, India, and other neighboring states. These include the ecological destruction and control of rivers by upstream countries, leading to national security challenges and the potential for "water wars"—echoing the fears expressed by Indian scholars at APEC 2009.

India remains particularly sensitive to China's dam-building activities in southern Tibet (which India calls Arunachal Pradesh) and along the Yarlung Tsangpo River. The concern lies in China’s potential to control upstream water resources, affecting both India’s water security and national security. These concerns extend to broader opposition to China's dam-building efforts, especially when discussed at international forums where such issues often provoke strong reactions.

Disputes and tensions between Indian-Myanmar scholars and China over hydropower construction and its transboundary impacts reflect deep-rooted contradictions in China’s strategic use of water resources, particularly concerning cross-border river basin management and national security sensitivities. These disagreements pose a serious threat to regional stability and could spark fierce conflicts.

In short, the Yarlung Tsangpo Dam is “not merely an energy infrastructure project,” but a multi-layered initiative with intertwining motivations. On the surface, it supports energy transition and regional development; in substance, it functions as a vehicle for debt restructuring and financial operations. Strategically, it applies pressure on India and downstream countries; ethically, it faces heavy ESG and international accountability challenges.

If China's debt crisis continues to intensify, the country may increasingly rely on digital financial tools like the central bank digital currency (e-CNY), carbon credit platforms, and virtual asset management, further repackaging such mega-projects as "future capital" to be sold to domestic and foreign investors.

Experts caution that if China's debt problem worsens, the model of combining geopolitics, debt, and infrastructure ("geo-debt-infra strategy") will expand. This could reinforce support for projects like South-to-North Water Diversion, and additional dam-building on the Nujiang and Lancang Rivers. These areas are ecologically fragile, and dam construction could severely impact endangered species, local landscapes, and indigenous cultures. In the dry season, reduced downstream flow could cause riverbed drying, damaging agriculture and fisheries. The ecological imbalance and threats to biodiversity are significant, especially considering that tens of millions of people in downstream countries rely on the Mekong River, which the Lancang becomes. Additionally, complex geological conditions raise the risks of earthquakes and natural disasters.

Moreover, China's use of upstream dams to create a strategic water advantage may lead to increased disputes over water distribution and management with downstream nations, intensifying geopolitical tensions—a major hidden risk to regional peace and stability.

A Prayer for Believers

To those who hold faith, we offer an urgent call to prayer:

O Supreme Creator, we humbly come before You,

For this sacred river—the Yarlung Tsangpo—that nurtures life,

For all beings upon the plateau,

For the safety and well-being of the hundreds of millions downstream,

We offer this sincere prayer.

May humankind set aside arrogance and greed,

And no longer use power and technology to destroy nature’s balance;

May those in power be granted wisdom and compassion,

That they may not sow ten thousand years of disaster for short-term gain.

May science and faith walk together,

May development coexist with sustainability;

May the waters flow freely, unshackled;

May the mountains and rivers know peace, and tremble no more.

If the seeds of catastrophe have already been sown,

May all beings awaken, and act swiftly to turn and mitigate;

If a window of hope remains,

May courageous souls rise, and shine a light of justice into the darkness.

May the four great elements—earth, water, fire, and wind—be brought into harmony;

May human hearts return to what is natural, lawful, and true.

May we cease to fight nature, and learn to walk alongside it;

May future generations still see the snow-fed torrents and hear the earth’s song.

May this world be filled with compassion, wisdom, peace, and reverence.

We pray in the name of the Most High.

Peter Li-Chang Kuo, the author created Taiwan's Precision Industry in his early years. Peter was a representative of the APEC CEO Summit and an expert in the third sector. He advocated "anti-corruption (AC)/cashless/e-commerce (E-Com)/ICT/IPR/IIA-TES / Micro-Business (MB)…and etc." to win the international bills and regulations.